Global Agenda Strengthening the Liberal World Order


Download Global Agenda Strengthening the Liberal World Order


Preview text

Global Agenda
Strengthening the Liberal World Order
April 2016

Global Agenda Council on the United States -­‐ Strengthening the Liberal World Order
Strengthening the Liberal World Order
A World Economic Forum White Paper

*The Global Agenda Council on the United States
Chair: Robert Kagan Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution

Vice-Chair: Karen Donfried President, The German Marshall Fund of the US

Members:
Heidi Crebo-Rediker Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations Ivo Daalder President, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs Paula J. Dobriansky Senior Fellow, JFK Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs "Future of Diplomacy Project" Harvard University Elizabeth C. Economy C. V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director, Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Relations David T. Ellwood Scott M. Black Professor of Political Economy, Harvard Kennedy School of Government Rafael Fernández de Castro Chair, International Studies Department, Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico Susan Glasser Editor, Politico Margaret Goodlander National Security Adviser to John McCain (2013-2014) Jane Harman Director, President and Chief Executive Officer , The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Frederick Kempe President and Chief Executive Officer, The Atlantic Council Fumiaki Kubo Professor, Faculty of Law, The University of Tokyo Euvin Naidoo Executive in Residence, Wits Business School, Johannesburg, South Africa Vali R. Nasr Dean and Professor, International Relations, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University Ana Palacio Member, Spanish Council of State Dan Runde William A. Schreyer Chair and Director, Project on Prosperity and Development, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Council Manager: Kelly Ommundsen Global Leadership Fellow, Community Lead, North America, World Economic Forum
Council Lead: Paul Smyke Head, North America, World Economic Forum

Global Agenda Council on the United States -­‐ Strengthening the Liberal World Order
Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... ……………..2 Basket 1 – Strengthening and Adapting the Liberal Economic Order.................................……………..4 Basket 2 – Strengthening the International Security Order.................................................. ……………..6 Basket 3 – Taking Advantage of the Energy Revolution......................................................……………....8 Basket 4 – Education, Innovation, Entrepreneurship: America’s Most Desired Commodities………..10 Conclusion ...............................................................................................................................……………...13

Global Agenda Council on the United States -­‐ Strengthening the Liberal World Order
Introduction
The world order that was created in the aftermath of World War II has produced immense benefits for peoples across the planet. The past 70 years have seen an unprecedented growth in prosperity, lifting billions out of poverty. Democratic government, once rare, has spread to over 100 nations around the world, on every continent, for people of all races and religions. And, although the period has been marked by war and suffering as well, peace among the great powers has been preserved. There has been no recurrence of the two devastating world wars of the first half of the 20th century.
Today, however, that liberal order is being challenged by a variety of forces – by powerful authoritarian governments and anti-liberal fundamentalist movements, as well as by long-term shifts in the global economy and changes in the physical environment. The questions we face are whether this liberal world order is worth defending, and whether it is capable of surviving the present challenges. We believe the answer to both questions is an emphatic “yes”.
To say that a “liberal” world order is worth defending is, of course, a declaration on behalf of a certain set of principles – a belief that the rights of the individual are primary, that it is the responsibility of governments to protect those rights and that democratic government, in particular, offers the best chance for human dignity, justice and freedom. This is not a universally held view. The leaders of some nations and more than a few people around the world disagree on this hierarchy of values.
There is, and always has been, a division about how nations should be governed, and about the differences in and between democratic and autocratic forms, the role of religion and the connections to economic structures. While recognizing that these differences exist and that every structure has its failings, the authors of this report are confident in their conviction that the liberal world order offers the best hope for meeting human aspirations, both material and spiritual, and for calling forth the very best in people across the world.
To strengthen and preserve this order, however, will require a renewal of American leadership in the international system. The present world order has been forged by many hands and peoples, but the role of the United States in both shaping and defending it has been critical. American military power, the dynamism of the US economy and the great number of close alliances and friendships that the United States enjoys with other powers and peoples have provided the critical architecture in which this liberal world order has flourished. A weakening of America’s commitment or its capabilities, or both, would invariably lead to its collapse.
In recent years, many have come to doubt America’s ability to continue playing this role. Only seven years ago, pundits were talking of a “post-American world” with a declining United States and a remarkable “rise of the rest”. These days, however, that prognosis appears to have been at least premature. The US has substantially recovered from the Great Recession, while the once-heralded “rise of the rest” has stalled.
America’s share of global GDP will continue to decline marginally, while China, even at slower rates of growth, will soon become the largest economy in the world as measured in total GDP. Whether this is the best measure of relative power and international influence, however, is doubtful. China faces significant problems both at home and abroad, as its leaders well recognize. America’s leading position in East Asia continues to be buttressed by strong alliances with powerful nations.
The same is true in other parts of the world where the US has played a leading role. Many around the world who once decried America’s overseas involvement as “hegemonic” now seek greater US engagement in international affairs and worry more about American retrenchment. Surveys of global opinion, including our own extensive discussions with officials and thought leaders around the world, suggest that, while there is continued ambivalence about the US, there is a worry in some parts of the world that, while American interventionism may have gone too far in the 2000s, the US has become too disengaged in recent years.1
This view is particularly strong in the three regions where the United States has carried the main burden of providing security since World War II: in East Asia, Europe (especially in the part of Europe that borders Russia) and the Middle East. In all three of these critical regions, American allies generally seek more US leadership, not less.
Among the American public, too, there are signs of greater receptivity to a more active global role. While Americans are naturally wary of deep and extensive overseas involvement after two difficult wars, they are not embracing
1 Wike, Richard, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter. "Global Publics Back U.S. on Fighting ISIS, but Are Critical of Post-­‐9/11 Torture." Pew Research Centers Global Attitudes Project RSS. N.p., 23 June 2015. Web. 22 Oct. 2015.

Global Agenda Council on the United States -­‐ Strengthening the Liberal World Order
isolationism. They have supported an active US role – in combatting ISIS, for instance – in strengthening the US role in Asia or in seeking diplomatic solutions to long-festering problems – especially when there has been bipartisan consensus in Washington on the need for such a role.2
What is missing for most Americans is a sense of strategy and purpose in US foreign policy. During the Cold War, fear of the Soviet Union and international communism did not always produce agreement on policy but did provide an answer, for most, as to why the United States needed to play an international role and what that role should be. There was a lingering memory, as well, of what the price of American withdrawal and abstention had been in the 1930s. Now these old concerns and memories have faded, and there is no global threat to replace communism and the Soviet empire. Radical Islamic jihadism is a serious threat, and will require a robust response by the US and its allies. But it would be a mistake to shape a global strategy entirely around this challenge.
One of the tasks of this paper is to try to provide an American strategy that meets present circumstances and requirements. At the core of this foreign policy is the understanding that the country’s fundamental interests are still best served by upholding the liberal world order – economic, political and strategic – that was established at the end of the World War II and further strengthened and entrenched by the revolutions of 1989.
In addition to reminding Americans and others around the world of the value of this order, and of America’s central role in upholding it, we also hope to bring it up to date: reaffirming some traditional approaches where necessary, but also reforming and changing traditional approaches where needed. The world is not the same as it was in 1945, so any effort to strengthen the liberal world order must account for these substantial changes in the international system.
We believe there is an opportunity now and in the years to come to re-engage the United States effectively in global affairs, slow the wild pendulum swings of the past decade and build a steadier and more consistent US foreign policy that can best serve American interests and values while serving the interests of many others around the world who share those values.
To take advantage of the present opportunity, however, it will be necessary to strengthen American public support for re-engagement, while adapting America’s engagement in a way that plays to its strengths and advantages and is responsive to the needs and concerns of others around the world. We need to establish new foundations for an effective US foreign policy for a new international environment.
Finally, we recognize that the United States is not omnipotent and faces limitations in what it can do. The emphasis must be on taking advantages of American comparative advantages in certain key areas, doing what the US does best, and in a way that reflects what those around the world want and need from America.
To this end, we focus on four baskets of policies – Strengthening and Adapting the Liberal Economic Order; Strengthening the International Security Order; Taking Advantage of the Energy Revolution; and Playing to America’s Strengths in Education, Innovation and Entrepreneurship.
A key feature of our approach is that these four policy baskets are mutually reinforcing and need to be seen, and carried out, not in isolation but as part of a broad package. There is a tendency in the American political system for different groups to support different elements of this strategy, while not supporting or actively opposing other parts. This has led to incoherence and imbalance in America’s overall approach to the world. The fact is, the liberal world order itself is made up of mutually reinforcing elements: a liberal, free-trade economic order tends to strengthen ties among nations and can make nations hesitant to go to war, while a healthy security order encourages economic rather than military competition and provides the necessary underlying international stability to allow the liberal economic order to function.
Pursuing engagement in all four baskets can also make US leadership more palatable to greater segments of the world. Those who may take a skeptical view of US military power or geopolitical leadership, for instance, may nevertheless welcome greater American engagement on matters of education, entrepreneurship and innovation.
A key task for American political leaders and policy advocates will be to demonstrate and explain how the pieces fit together: how trade enhances security; how military power undergirds prosperity; and how providing access to American education strengthens the forces dedicated to a more open and freer world. We believe that, by looking at the whole picture, the importance of the individual strands of policy will be clearer and therefore easier to sell.
2 As New Dangers Loom, More Think the U.S. Does 'Too Little' to Solve World Problems." Pew Research Center for the People and the Press RSS. N.p., 28 Aug. 2014. Web. 22 Oct. 2015.

Global Agenda Council on the United States -­‐ Strengthening the Liberal World Order
Basket 1 – Strengthening and Adapting the Liberal Economic Order
Support the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Support deepened US investment in a robust, representative and legitimate Bretton Woods system, including support for IMF reform Work with new institutions, including the New Development Bank and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), to uphold high standards and collaborate and integrate with existing development institutions
As the United States emerges from the global economic crisis, it has the opportunity to refocus and reinvest in the liberal economic order it helped create and shape it for the future. Multilateral institutions within this order emerged stronger and more resilient after the crisis, with their relevance and need underscored. However, their continued centrality to the system rests on leadership from within, most notably from the United States.
Existing multilateral financial institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, will inevitably evolve to reflect changing realities and a shifting economic balance of power. American policy should work to ensure that these changes are consistent with liberal economic norms and reflect the legitimate needs of partners that share and benefit from this order.
New institutions, meanwhile, have arisen and will continue to arise, sponsored by powers that may wish to challenge the existing order. The US, together with its allies, should strive to embrace these new institutions and engage constructively with them, encouraging them insofar as they reinforce liberal economic norms, discouraging them when they challenge those norms and, in general, urging them to engage collectively as part of a larger multilateral system, rather than seek to operate as an alternative.
Free Trade and the Global Trading System
Free, fair and open rules-based trading systems are the cornerstone of the liberal economic order, whether through the World Trade Organization (WTO) or regional trade agreements with partners. The US has benefitted from this system that it helped create, both economically and strategically, while at the same time advancing US interests and values. Other partners within this system have also benefited, including the new rising economic powers and especially China.
The US currently has a robust trade agenda underway and should push forward to realize both the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), made up of 12 countries and encompassing 40% of global GDP and one-third of all trade, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), made up of the US and its EU allies representing $1 trillion in trade every year. While not every trade agreement is a good agreement, both of these agreements should enable the US and its partners to set new and higher standards of trade that will raise the bar throughout the global trading system.
Both the TPP and TTIP agreements are ambitious in scope and substance. Congress and the American public will need to understand fully how the US can benefit from them, both economically and strategically. Given concerns expressed about trade on both sides of the political aisle, there is no guarantee that divisions between parties, and within parties, might not squander this opportunity. These trade agreements must fully incorporate the will of Congress as set forth in Trade Promotion Authority by law.
Having accomplished this objective, the US must then lead with these two important regional trade agreements to shape the future of globalization and the multilateral system. The US should also continue to push forward productive initiatives at the WTO, such as the 2013 Trade Facilitation Agreement, now awaiting ratification, which could improve efficiency in the global trading system by reducing costs and administrative burdens associated with moving goods across borders.
While enhancing and enforcing the legal and institutional architecture of the global free trade system is of strategic and economic importance to the United States, so too is the imperative that trade routes channeling trillions of dollars’ worth of goods around the globe remain open and safe for trade and commerce. Whether in the South China Sea or in Arctic waters, the principle of freedom of navigation underpins the global trading system and must be maintained.

Global Agenda Council on the United States -­‐ Strengthening the Liberal World Order
Existing Institutions and the Bretton Woods System
The United States was the principal founder of the institutions in the Bretton Woods system, including the IMF and World Bank. These institutions have been important partners in supporting the liberal order. The US and its allies have looked to these institutions to address the economic dimensions of the Ukraine crisis and the West African Ebola crisis. As the largest shareholder, the US has led these institutions through many transitions.
These institutions need to be robust, representative and legitimate to work. This means that they need to reflect economic realities, including the growing economic contributions of nations like China and India. A multilateral economic institution in which the Benelux countries have a greater voting share than China cannot expect to play a central role in the global economic order of the 21st century. Because the US has an interest in the continued health and legitimacy of such institutions, it is in America’s interest to support the necessary reforms of those institutions.
There is enough blame to go around, but for several years Congress failed to approve the US-led 2010 IMF quota reforms to expand representation of emerging economies to reflect their role in the global economy and increase financial resources. As a result, the US risked losing a substantial degree of influence at the IMF or seeing the IMF itself delegitimized. China and others benefitted from US inaction on IMF quota reform to gain support for the AIIB and the New Development Bank. In the future, Congress and the Administration need to act cooperatively and decisively to show that the US will engage constructively and lead the IMF through transitions to come.
Further, Bretton Woods international financial institutions play a crucial strategic role in the rules-based liberal international economic order and should not be taken for granted. The United States must refocus and re-invest in its own system and provide the financial and intellectual resources necessary to ensure that these institutions can fulfil their mandates. In addition to contributing sufficient financial resources, this includes ensuring continuous, highly qualified US representation on each of the executive boards of these institutions. The past several years have seen many of these board seats left vacant. The US should continue to be actively involved in leadership selection as the management terms at these institutions come to an end.
Finally, the US should seek ways to amplify the impact of these institutions in the field of public-private cooperation. In a world in which private capital flows to developing countries outweigh official development assistance by more than 10:1, finding ways to meld institutional actors and business is crucial.
This entails standard-setting, confidence-building and ensuring the existence of predictable rules and legal security. Here the Bretton Woods Institutions and especially the World Bank Group play a key role. The US should lead the push to reinforce the IFC and, in particular, to strengthen the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency through bolstering its mandate and increasing its operational funds. Channeling the forces of the private sector is one of the challenges and necessities of the global liberal economic order.
New Institutions
Rising economic powers have already responded to their lack of proportional influence at existing development institutions by creating new institutions, such as the New Development Bank and the AIIB, where they can wield greater influence. The emergence of new institutions must be expected, and some of these new institutions may well challenge not only the existing institutions, but also the liberal economic order itself.
It is very much in the interest of those with a stake in the liberal economic order for the US and its allies to help shape these new institutions in a way that is compatible with the existing liberal economic order. This is possible. Over the decades since World War II, new regional development institutions emerged without the United States’ direct involvement, such as the Islamic Development Bank, CAF (the Development Bank of Latin America) and the European Investment Bank, with each finding its role within the greater development institutional system and leaving the overall system no weaker.
The United States should strongly encourage new development and financing institutions, like the New Development Bank and the AIIB, to collaborate and integrate with existing regional and multilateral development institutions to ensure they uphold high standards. It should also be willing to embrace them if they prove through their actions that they aim to complement and engage rather than compete in the existing system.

Global Agenda Council on the United States -­‐ Strengthening the Liberal World Order
Basket 2 – Strengthening the International Security Order
Reassure allies and friends of US reliability as a guarantor of security Establish a modus operandi with non-allied independent powers on common interests Demonstrate American effectiveness in diplomacy and problem-solving, and its capability in building partnerships and pulling nations together in common efforts Deter and contain real or potential adversaries while showing the benefits of integration in the liberal world order End sequestration and increase US defense capabilities and international affairs budget
The liberal world order that arose after World War II rested on three pillars: a liberal economic order that could bring a greater degree of prosperity to all who participated in it; a liberal political order that favored democratic governance; and a strategic order that suppressed the great power conflicts that had produced so much destruction in the first half of the 20th century.
The first two involved extensive mutual cooperation among nations and peoples. The latter depended almost entirely on the power and commitment of a single power: the United States. It was the US military presence in both Europe and Asia that effectively put an end to the cycle of warfare that had plagued both regions. American military power acted as a guarantor of mutual security that allowed former enemies – such as Germany and France – to join in economic and political union without fear of another conflict.
In East Asia, the American presence allowed Japan, and later China, to focus on economic growth and modernization without fear of another round of conflict that had caused such damage to both countries between the 1890s and the 1940s. In the Middle East, too, albeit with less consistent success, the United States served as a mediator and guarantor of the security of the leading nations, even those that were engaged in conflict with one another.
The fact that the world has gone seven decades without a great power war is, in historical terms, a remarkable achievement. Even the “long peace” that followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars was not without costly great power wars (the Crimean War of the 1850s and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871). This long and broad era of strategic peace has, in turn, made possible the other successes of the liberal world order: the unprecedented prosperity of the post-war era and equally unprecedented spread of democratic governance.
Today, however, this strategic order is being challenged on several fronts. In Europe, Russia has committed the first cross-border aggression by a major power since World War II, raised the specter of renewed nuclear competition and caused tensions with NATO allies from the Baltics in the North to Turkey in the South.
In East Asia, China’s greater military power and expanding strategic reach have raised questions about the reliability of America’s security guarantees to its allies and to America’s ability to play its traditional role of keep international trade routes and sea lanes open. These challenges promise to be especially pressing in the South and East China Seas, where Chinese territorial claims conflict with those of other nations, including close allies of the United States, and in some cases conflict with international law.
In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, Iran has deployed forces in Syria and supported guerrilla forces in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine in a bid for growing hegemony in the region. The forces of ISIS have gained control of territory spanning the border between Iraq and Syria and threaten to grow stronger, feeding off sectarian strife in both countries. The crises in the Middle East have also spilled over into Europe, putting immense pressure of European political institutions and on security ties among European countries and between Europe and the United States.
The chaos and destruction in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East have produced the largest mass movement of people since World War II. This has tested institutional ability and strained the capacity of frontline states. It has also fuelled populist and xenophobic rhetoric intended for domestic political audiences in the United States and particularly Europe that has sought to blur the lines between those owed international protection and economic migrants.
While the security concerns are real, and vetting and vigilance are necessary, it is crucial that the US and its partners live up to their commitment to protect internationally endangered persons under the Refugee Convention. This is not only a question of doing the moral or legally obligated thing, it is smart policy. Denying entry to refugees based on a fear of radicalization at home does not resolve security concerns, it merely pushes greater numbers of at-risk communities towards the conditions that foster violence, hopelessness and alienation.
At the same time, the United States and its partners must lead an effort to update the current legal and institutional

Global Agenda Council on the United States -­‐ Strengthening the Liberal World Order
framework established after World War II and ill-suited for the modern world.
These challenges will not go away but must be addressed, intelligently and firmly. The US must provide leadership, including military leadership, to help provide a solution to the Syrian political crisis while also reducing and eliminating the threat posed by ISIS.
Overall, to sustain the liberal world order requires that the United States continue to play the role it has played since World War II in providing security and deterring aggression. At a time when much of the world has come to doubt America’s will to continue its global engagement, steps need to be taken to provide reassurance.
Reassuring Allies and Friends of American Reliability
The first task is to reassure friends and allies of the dependability of US security guarantees. Nations that begin to question America’s reliability will seek other means of protecting their security, and while we would like to believe that they do so in ways that serve both their interests and ours, it is more often the case that the courses they choose are destructive and disruptive to the liberal order and to general security.
Gulf States supporting radical forces in the sectarian struggles of the Middle East, for instance, have lessened everyone’s security, including their own. A close ally such as Japan should not be left on its own to meet the challenges of a region where the exercise of Japanese military power, unmoored from close ties with America, raises historical concerns. In Asia as well as in Europe, allies facing a China growing in power and ambition or a Russia with great power and expansionist ambitions need to be reassured that the US has both the will and the capacity to provide defense against aggression. That has been and remains the cornerstone of the security system that has undergirded the liberal world order.
To this end, we must first work to strengthen the political, military and economic capacity of allies. The stronger they are, the more effective is the deterrence provided by the alliance. While dependence on the US for ultimate security is unavoidable in this international system, to the degree allies can do more on their own and can partner with the United States to provide overall security, the alliances will be healthier and American public support for a globally engaged foreign policy will be greater.
At the same time, it is important to demonstrate to friends and allies that the US can provide diplomatic solutions to problems, has a unique capacity to bring parties together to find common solutions to problems and does not pursue aims by strictly unilateral or military means. Although effective leadership often requires moving out ahead of other powers, the United States needs to avoid creating the perception of being a rogue superpower.
Establishing a Modus Operandi with Independent Powers
We also need to find ways to incorporate rising democratic powers and organizations that are not traditional American allies into the overall security framework. This means finding a modus operandi with nations like India and Brazil, or the Arab League, which do not want to join an American alliance system but share some common interests. Whether this requires new institutions or simply a supple diplomacy remains to be seen. But an effective American policy will find a way to work with independent powers that nevertheless share a common world view.
Having reassured allies and friends of America’s reliability as a provider of security and a facilitator of diplomatic solutions, it becomes possible to deal more effectively with real and potential adversaries. There is no more effective deterrent to opponents of the liberal world order, and to a stable security order, than the reality and perception of a strong, unified alliance and cooperation among friendly states that share common goals. Behind that must be the evident willingness and capability of the United States to act to deter aggression; but the perception of effective US leadership, and the welcoming of an American role by friends and allies, adds significantly to deterrence.
In dealing with actual or potential adversaries, the first step must be effective deterrence and containment. It is essential that the United States make clear that the costs of aggression outweigh the benefits and that success is impossible. This requires, above all, maintaining sufficient military strength, and the will to use it, so that potential challengers have a clear sense of the risks. Nothing invites aggression like ambiguity, in terms of both means and will, on the part of the deterring power.
With effective deterrence established, however, it is possible and desirable to offer would-be challengers an alternative

Global Agenda Council on the United States -­‐ Strengthening the Liberal World Order
path. While making it clear that military action will not succeed and will be costly, the United States can also make clear, through diplomatic and economic “carrots and sticks”, that a peaceful rise through integration into the existing economic and political system is a much more fruitful course. Wherever possible, coalitions that espouse these views should be assembled with the US operating as an indispensable partner.
Ending Sequestration and Increasing US Defense Capabilities
The United States spends more on defense than any other nation in the world, and indeed more than the next 10 nations combined. This fact is often noted to suggest that the US defense budget is either high enough or too high. What many fail to take into account, however, is that the United States plays a unique role in the world. No other nation has the global responsibilities that the United States has shouldered.
The fact is, the US has been the main provider of security throughout the world for the past 70 years. Its navy keeps the sea lanes open to international trade. Its land, air and naval forces help maintain the peace in East Asia, Europe, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Therefore, American forces must have far greater capacity and reach than those of other nations.
Today, as a result of budget cuts, including those mandated by the so-called sequester, America’s ability to continue playing this vital role in all these theatres is increasingly in question. Every recent secretary of defense, every chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and every head of every service has warned that, unless spending on defense increases, US forces will lose their capacity to provide security, will “hollow” out, will be inadequately trained and equipped to carry out their global missions.
Given the role that the US plays in providing the underlying security that allows the liberal world order to function and flourish, continuing down this path not only threatens US security, but also the order itself. To carry out any of the goals in this report, therefore, will require taking on the political challenge of fighting to lift the sequester caps. As a political matter, this may require compromises on both taxes and non-defense domestic spending. If so, those compromises should be made.
Basket 3 – Taking Advantage of the Energy Revolution
Help European and Asian allies diversify energy sources, especially in gas Leverage US influence, productive capacities and declining energy prices to increase pressure on energyexporting autocratic nations hostile to the liberal world order Support and hasten the weakening of OPEC and other energy cartels by creating investment environments that support increased production and therefore diversified supplies on the global market and working with other producers to support liberal economic policies
The US is leading a revolution in energy – with profound implications for America’s standing in the world, its relations with other major powers and for global order. In less than a decade, US oil and gas production exploded as new technologies released abundant fuels from shale rock formations across the country. This revolution and other global factors contributed to a nearly 50% decline in the global price of oil since June 2014.
Today, the US is the world’s largest producer of both oil and gas, outpacing Russia, and largest oil producer, topping Saudi Arabia. However, because oil is a global commodity and gas is increasingly becoming so, the US is still affected by global movements in supply and demand. At the same time, through increased energy efficiencies, utilization of domestically produced gas and use of renewables, the US has significantly reduced greenhouse gas emissions and is reducing its dependence on oil.
As a result of these holistic changes in US energy abundance and consumption, America is entering an era of energy security unlike any it has enjoyed in the last half-century. Energy security is not only an achievable goal for US policy; it is close to a reality – one that can and should affect the way the United States engages the rest of the world.

Preparing to load PDF file. please wait...

0 of 0
100%
Global Agenda Strengthening the Liberal World Order